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New Hampshire’s Claremont Case and the Separation of 
Powers 
 
EDWARD C. MOSCA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Court decisions involving the adequacy of public education raise some 
obvious separation of powers problems.  These include the institutional 
competency of courts to determine what level of education is adequate and 
how much funding is necessary to reach that level, and the authority of 
courts to enforce such judgments.  This article will examine these problems 
through New Hampshire’s serial education funding litigation, the Clare-
mont case.1  
  
 * Edward C. Mosca is an attorney in private practice.  He has a special interest in appellate and 
constitutional law. 
 1. I use the phrase “Claremont case” to refer to the line of cases that commenced with Claremont 
Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993) and Claremont Sch. Dist.  v. Gov., 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 
1997).  These initial decisions are generally known as Claremont I and Claremont II, which is how I 
will refer to them.  I count, and will refer to, the challenge to Justice Batchelder’s participation in 
Claremont II as Claremont III (Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 712 A.2d 612 (N.H. 1998)); the advisory 
opinion on former Governor Shaheen’s “ABC” education funding plan as Claremont IV (Opinion of the 
Justices (School Financing),712 A.2d 1080 (N.H. 1998)); the State’s request for an extension to im-
plement a new education funding system as Claremont V (Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 725 A.2d 648 
(N.H. 1998)); the advisory opinion on the constitutionality of a proposed tax plan referendum as 
Claremont VI (Opinion of the Justices (School Financing), 725 A.2d 1082 (N.H. 1999)); the Claremont 
plaintiffs’ challenge to a “phase-in” in certain communities of the state property tax as Claremont VII 
(Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 744 A.2d 1107 (N.H. 1999)); the Claremont plaintiffs’ successful re-
quest for attorney’s fees as Claremont VIII (Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 761 A.2d 389 (N.H. 1999)); 
the advisory opinion on a targeted aid plan proposed by former State Senator Fred King as Claremont 
IX (Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing System), 765 A.2d 673 (N.H. 2000)); 
the decision upholding the constitutionality of the state property tax as Claremont X (Sirrell v. State, 
780 A.2d 494 (N.H. 2001)); and the “accountability decision” as Claremont XI (Claremont Sch. Dist. v. 
Gov., 794 A.2d 744 (N.H. 2002)).  Commentators have truncated matters by referring to the account-
ability decision, which I refer to as Claremont XI, as Claremont III.  See e.g. John Dayton & Anne 
Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2351, 2395 (2004) 
(stating that “In Claremont III, the court declared that ‘accountability is an essential component of the 
State’s [constitutional] duty and . . . the existing statutory scheme has deficiencies that are inconsistent 
with the State’s duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education’”).  This, however, does not give 
a true sense of the serial nature of the litigation.  Indeed, while not discussed in this article, there has 
also been a Claremont XII (Baines v. N.H. Sen. Pres., 876 A.2d 768 (N.H. 2005)) (rejecting challenge 
to process used to pass education funding law), and a Claremont XIII (Hughes v. Speaker of N.H. H.R., 
876 A.2d 736 (N.H. 2005)) (rejecting challenge to process used to pass education funding law).  More 
importantly, Claremont XIV (Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12 & a. v. N.H., Case No. 2006-0258 (Apr. 
19, 2006)), which involves the question of whether education funding legislation is unconstitutional 
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While Claremont I, which announced that the State has a duty to pro-
vide an adequate education and to guarantee adequate funding, was unani-
mously decided,2  the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s extension of that 
holding to require a particular definition of an adequate education in 
Claremont II,3 and later to require “standards of accountability” in Clare-
mont XI,4 provoked dissenting opinions that charged that the majority had 
violated the separation of powers.5   
In each case, the majority’s response was to summarily deny any viola-
tion.  In Claremont II, the majority stated, “[w]e agree with [dissenting] 
Justice Horton that we were not appointed to establish educational policy. . 
. .  That is why we leave such matters . . . to the two co-equal branches of 
government.”6  Similarly, in Claremont XI, in which two of the five jus-
tices dissented, the majority stated, “[w]e recognize that we are not ap-
pointed to establish educational policy and have not done so today.”7  Un-
fortunately, summarily denying that the Court had violated the separation 
of powers was the extent to which the majority examined the issue, while 
the dissent’s treatment was only slightly less superficial.  This article will 
attempt to help fill this void.8   
I will start by briefly reviewing the history of education funding litiga-
tion because this context is essential to understanding the Claremont case.9  
I will then undertake a limited review of the Claremont case.  Finally, I 
will consider Claremont from the standpoint of the separation of powers.  I 
begin by examining the text and structure of the State Constitution and 
then consider whether there are judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for determining what level of education is adequate and how 
much funding is necessary to reach that level.  Because there is a textually 
demonstrable commitment of education funding and education policy to 
  
because it does not define an adequate education and determine its cost based on such a definition, and 
thus squarely involves the separation of powers, is now before the Supreme Court. 
 2. 635 A.2d at 1382. 
 3. 703 A.2d at 1359. 
 4. 794 A.2d at 745. 
 5. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1362-63 (Horton, J., dissenting); Claremont XI, 794 A.2d at 761-63 
(Nadeau and Dalianis, JJ., dissenting). 
 6. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1360.  
 7. 794 A.2d at 760.  Note that one of the dissenters, Justice Nadeau, retired in December 2005. 
 8. This article is not the first examination of the Claremont case from the standpoint of the separa-
tion of powers.  In Letters to the Educators, Attorney Eugene Van Loan III, writing under the pseudo-
nym Rasputin, examined the topic as part of a comprehensive critique of the Claremont case.  Eugene 
Van Loan III, Letters to the Educators, http://www.mainstream.net/nhpolitics (accessed May 22, 2006).   
 9. See Andru H. Volinsky, New Hampshire’s Education-Funding Litigation: Claremont School 
District v. Governor, 83 Neb. L. Rev. 836, 844 (2005) (“Our experience in New Hampshire with the 
Claremont case is representative of the state-constitution-based school-funding litigation that has 
developed across the nation in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.”). 
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the legislative branch, and because what an adequate education comprises 
and costs are quintessentially political questions, Claremont represents a 
clear trespass on legislative powers and should be overruled. 
II. CLAREMONT IN CONTEXT 
Education funding litigation is not unique to New Hampshire.  Accord-
ing to the Campaign for Educational Equity,10 as of November 2005, 
“[l]awsuits challenging state methods of funding public schools have been 
brought in [forty-five] of the [fifty] states.”11  
The Claremont case is part of what has been called the “third wave” of 
school funding litigation.12  The first wave began in the late 1960s,13 and 
involved challenges under the federal equal protection clause.14  The first 
successful case was in 1971, when the California Supreme Court held that 
education was a fundamental right and was violated by “substantial dis-
parities among school districts in the amount of revenue available for edu-
cation” in Serrano v. Priest.15   
The first wave was short-lived.  In 1973, the United States Supreme 
Court held that education was not a fundamental right under the federal 
  
 10. Information regarding the Campaign for Educational Equity can be found at its website “Ac-
cess,” at http://www.schoolfunding.info (accessed May 22, 2006).  It was formed in June 2005 by 
Teachers College, Columbia University.  Teachers College’s President Michael Levine in launching the 
organization “explained that the new campaign is designed to overcome the gap in educational access 
and achievement between America’s most and least advantaged students. ‘We consider ‘the gap’ to be 
the educational equivalent of AIDS or cancer in medicine,’ he said.”  Access, Michael Rebell Will Lead 
“Campaign for Educational Equity” at Teachers College, http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/policy/ 
6-16-05rebelltotc.php3 (June 16, 2005).  The website of the Claremont plaintiffs also refers to “the 
gap.”  New Hampshire Citizens’ Voice Project, A Statewide Community Dialogue About Quality Edu-
cation, http://www.nhcvp.org/fundgap.php (accessed May 22, 2006).   
 11. The Access website reports that the only states not to have undergone education funding litiga-
tion are Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada and Utah.  http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/ 
litigation.php3 (accessed May 22, 2006).  
 12. Commentators have described “three waves” of school funding litigation.  Michael Heise, State 
Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 Temp. 
L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (1995); see William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School 
Finance Litigation: the Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 597, 598 (1994) (“chal-
lenges to the school finance systems of the various states can be divided into three distinct ‘waves’ of 
cases”); see also William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: a Re-
examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 1185, 1188 (2003). 
 13. Burrus v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff’d, 397 U.S. 44 (1970); McInnis v. 
Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff’d sub. nom. McInnis v. Oglive, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); see 
Koski, supra n. 12, at 1213-14. 
 14. Koski, supra n. 12, at 1188 (“[S]chool finance litigation initially focused on the federal Consti-
tution’s Equal Protection Clause and was fueled by the argument that per-student funding should be 
substantially equal or at least not dependent upon the wealth of the school district in which the student 
resided.”). 
 15. 487 P.2d 1241, 1265 (Cal. 1971).  
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Constitution in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,16 
and applied rational basis review to uphold the challenged education fund-
ing system.17  In his dissent, Justice Marshall encouraged prospective liti-
gants to turn to state constitutions to achieve their objectives, urging that 
“nothing in the Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state 
educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.”18 
The second wave broke almost immediately after Rodriguez when the 
New Jersey Supreme Court issued Robinson v. Cahill,19 which held that 
spending disparities between school districts violated the New Jersey Con-
stitution’s education clause, which required “a thorough and efficient sys-
tem of free public schools.”20  Second wave litigation sought equalized per 
pupil spending based on state education clauses, particularly equal protec-
tion clauses.21  For example, in 1976, the California Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the result in Serrano under the state constitution’s equal protection 
clause.22 
The third wave began in 1989 with cases such as the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky’s Rose v. Council for Better Education,23 and involved a shift 
from “equity” to “adequacy.” Rather than seeking to equalize spending 
among school districts based on equal protection arguments, third wave 
litigation maintained that the education clauses of state constitutions re-
quired a minimum level of education and that the state is required to pro-
vide a level of funding that is adequate to provide that education.24  
The shift was politically motivated.  Equity litigation created winners 
and losers because it caused wealth to be transferred from richer to poorer 
school districts.  Naturally, the school districts whose pieces of the educa-
tion funding pie got thinner were not happy.25  In contrast, by seeking to 
  
 16. 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (“It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional 
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”). 
 17. Id. at 49-55 (concluding that “local control” was a sufficient state interest to satisfy rational 
basis review).  
 18. Id. at 138 n. 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Allegedly, Marshall described his judicial philoso-
phy as “you do what you think is right and let the law catch up.”  Mark R. Levin, Men in Black: How 
the Supreme Court is Destroying America 17 (Regnery Publg., Inc. 2005). 
 19. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
 20. Id. at 294.  
 21. See Koski, supra n. 12, at 1191; Heise, supra n. 12, at 1152; Thro, supra n.12, at 603. 
 22. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976). 
 23. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
 24. See Koski, supra n. 12, at 1192; Heise, supra n. 12, at 1153; Thro, supra n. 12, at 603. 
 25. A well known example in New Hampshire of the political unpopularity of equity litigation is the 
effort by Killington to secede from Vermont and join New Hampshire.  See e.g. Daniel Barrick, Ver-
monters Persist in Desire to Move, Concord Monitor B1 (Feb. 2, 2005). 
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enlarge the size of the pie, adequacy litigation created the impression that 
everyone was a winner.26 
Adequacy litigation is considerably more policy laden than equity liti-
gation.  Once a court has determined that education is a fundamental right, 
the court’s subsequent review is limited to whether there is equal per pupil 
spending.  Adequacy litigation, on the other hand, requires a court to de-
termine what level of education is adequate and how much funding is nec-
essary to reach that level.  Thus, adequacy litigation raises concerns about 
the institutional competence of courts to make such judgments and the 
authority of courts to enforce such judgments.27  
Nevertheless, the results of third wave litigation have heavily favored 
plaintiffs.  According to the Campaign for Educational Equity, plaintiffs 
have triumphed in twenty-one states and lost in only seven states.28  Where 
plaintiffs have lost, courts have held that questions regarding educational 
adequacy are not justiciable because they are political questions.  For ex-
ample, in Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness, Inc. v. Chiles,29 the Florida 
Supreme Court held that “plaintiffs failed to demonstrate . . . an appropri-
ate standard for determining ‘adequacy’ of support provided by state that 
would not present a substantial risk of judicial intrusion into the powers” of 
the representative branches.30  In contrast, the high courts of other states, 
  
 26. See Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Educational Policy Reform, 55 Hastings 
L.J. 1077, 1198 n. 554 (2004) (“Adequacy was seen as a more politically appealing theory of reform 
that would permit the big spenders to continue spending big, while at the same time ensuring an ade-
quate education for all school children.”). 
 27. But see Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School Finance 
Litigation, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 569, 583 (2004) (“The adequacy standard is perhaps also more 
palatable to legal commentators and the public because it intrudes less upon the principle of separation 
of powers.  It is one thing to find that a system does not meet the constitutionally required minimum 
standard and is therefore unconstitutional until it is improved to meet that standard.  This is the funda-
mental function of courts: to say what the law is.”). 
 28. Supra n. 10.  Massachusetts and Texas are listed as both winners and losers. 
 29. 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996). 
 30. Id. at 408.  See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996) (“It would 
be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of quality courts might develop would 
actually be derived from the constitution in any meaningful sense.”); see also Ex parte James, 836 
So.2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002) (“Continuing the descent from the abstract to the concrete, we now recog-
nize that any specific remedy that the judiciary could impose would, in order to be effective, necessar-
ily involve a usurpation of that power entrusted exclusively to the Legislature.  Accordingly, compelled 
by the authorities discussed above – primarily by our duty under § 43 of the Alabama Constitution of 
1901 – we complete our judicially prudent retreat from this province of the legislative branch in order 
that we may remain obedient to the command of the people of the State of Alabama that we ‘never 
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government 
of laws and not of men.’”) (emphasis in original); Marrero v. Commonwealth of Pa., 739 A.2d 110, 
113-14 (Pa. 1999) (“[W]hat constitutes an ‘adequate’ education or what funds are ‘adequate’ to support 
such a program . . .  are matters which are exclusively within the purview of the General Assembly’s 
powers, and they are not subject to intervention by the judicial branch of our government.”); City of 
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995) (noting that, in attempting to define what constitutes 
a “thorough and efficient” education under the New Jersey Constitution, “the New Jersey Supreme 
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such as New Hampshire, have treated it as self evident that questions re-
garding educational adequacy are justiciable.31  
III. AN ABRIDGED CLAREMONT CHRONOLOGY 
At the center of the Claremont case is Part II, Article 83 of the State 
Constitution, which in part provides that: 
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, 
being essential to the preservation of a free government; and 
spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through 
the various parts of the country, being highly conducive to pro-
mote this end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magis-
trates, in all future periods of this government, to cherish the inter-
est of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public 
schools . . .32 
Despite the enigmatic nature of a “duty” that involves “cherish[ing] the 
interest of” a number of things including public schools,33 the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court in 1993 held that this “language commands, in no 
uncertain terms, that the State provide an education to all its citizens and 
that it support all public schools.”34   
The Court further held, despite the lack of any direct or indirect men-
tion of qualitative or quantitative measures, that “[A]rticle 83 imposes a 
duty on the State to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every 
educable child in the public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee 
adequate funding,”35 that there is a “corresponding right of the citizens to 
  
Court has struggled in its self-appointed role as overseer of education for more than twenty-one years, 
consuming significant funds, fees, time, effort, and court attention.  The volume of litigation and the 
extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes 
on the duties of a Legislature”). 
 31. See Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1360.  See also Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v. 
Huckabee, 2005 Ark. LEXIS 776 (Dec. 15, 2005) (“This court’s refusal to review school funding under 
our state constitution would be a complete abrogation of our judicial responsibility and would work a 
severe disservice to the people of this state.  We refuse to close our eyes or turn a deaf ear to claims of 
a dereliction of duty in the field of education.”); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211 (“In spite of any protestations 
to the contrary, we do not engage in judicial legislating.  We do not make policy.  We do not substitute 
our judgment for that of the General Assembly.  We simply take the plain directive of the Constitution, 
and, armed with its purpose, we decide what our General Assembly must achieve in complying with its 
solemn constitutional duty.”). 
 32. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 83. 
 33. See Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance: A Cautionary Note, 25 
Cap. U. L. Rev. 37 (1996) (describing mandate to cherish as “inherently nebulous”). 
 34. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378. 
 35. Id. at 1376.  
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its enforcement,”36 and that “[a]ny citizen has standing to enforce this 
right.”37  The Court, however, did not “define the parameters of the educa-
tion mandated by the constitution as that task is, in the first instance, for 
the legislature and the Governor.”38  
In Claremont II, which was issued in 1997, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court decided that defining the parameters of educational adequacy 
was not a task for the representative branches after all.  The Court struck 
down a definition of educational adequacy developed by the State Board of 
Education,39 and said instead it would “look to the seven criteria articulated 
by the Supreme Court of Kentucky [in the Rose decision] as establishing 
general, aspirational guidelines for defining educational adequacy.”40  
These so-called “general, aspirational guidelines” are: 
(1) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable stu-
dents to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; 
(2) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems 
to enable the student to make informed choices; 
(3) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable 
the student to understand the issues that affect his or her commu-
nity, state, and nation; 
(4) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental 
and physical wellness; 
(5) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appre-
ciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; 
(6) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either 
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose 
and pursue life work intelligently; and 
(7) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable pub-
lic school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in 
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.41 
The Court added that it “anticipated” that the representative branches 
would “promptly develop and adopt specific criteria implementing these 
guidelines.”42 
  
 36. Id. at 1381.  
 37. Id.   
 38. Id.   
 39. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1357-58. 
 40. Id. at 1359. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.   
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In Claremont II, the Court also changed the nature of the funding duty 
from guarantor to provider, as it held that “[t]o the extent that the property 
tax is used in the future to fund the provision of an adequate education, the 
tax must be administered in a manner that is equal in valuation and uni-
form in rate throughout the State.”43  The Court also gave the representa-
tive branches a grace period to replace the extant funding system, which 
relied heavily on the local property tax.44   
The Court also held that a “constitutionally adequate public education 
is a fundamental right.”45  Because “the fundamental right at issue is the 
right to a State funded constitutionally adequate public education,”46 the 
legislature could allow school districts “to dedicate additional resources to 
their schools.”47  The Court saw it as “basic,” however, that the State must 
assure “comparable funding.”48   
In Claremont IX, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an advi-
sory opinion that reiterated the change in the nature of the State’s funding 
duty.  It opined that proposed legislation that relied on local property taxes 
to fund some of the legislatively defined cost of educational adequacy 
would “directly contradict the mandate of Part II, Article 83, which im-
poses upon the State the exclusive obligation to fund a constitutionally 
adequate education.”49   
The Court also gratuitously opined that educational adequacy had “yet 
to be defined,”50 despite the enactment of RSA 193-E:2 in 1998, which 
essentially codified the “general, aspirational guidelines” handed down in 
Claremont II.51  For good measure, the Court added that “[i]t is not possi-
ble to determine the level of funding required to provide the children of 
  
 43. Id. at 1357.   
 44. Id. at 1360 (stating that “the present funding mechanism may remain in effect through the 1998 
tax year”).  At the time, “[l]ocally raised real property taxes [were] the principal source of revenue for 
public schools, providing on average from seventy-four to eighty-nine percent of total school revenue.”  
Id. at 1354. 
 45. Id. at 1359.  It is noteworthy that in Claremont I the court had said that “a free public education 
is at the very least an important, substantive right,” which is a lower level right under equal protection 
analysis than a fundamental right.  635 A.2d at 1381.  Claremont II does not attempt to explain how, in 
the intervening four years, the right to an education grew from a substantive right to a fundamental 
right.  
 46. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359. 
 47. Id. at 1360. 
 48. Id.  This makes the Claremont case a hybrid of equity and adequacy theory.  Every school dis-
trict must receive comparable state funding, which is equity theory, but school districts may use local 
taxes to increase the level of funding, which avoids the political problems experienced in Vermont with 
equity litigation.  Supra n. 25.  
 49. Claremont IX, 765 A.2d at 676.  
 50. Id. at 677. 
 51. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §193-E2 (1998).  In 2005, RSA 193-E:2 was re-titled , “Criteria for an 
Equitable Education.” However, the criteria remain unchanged. 
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this State with a constitutionally adequate education until its essential ele-
ments have been identified and defined.”52  
In Claremont XI, the Court held that “accountability is an essential 
component of the State’s duty.”53  It explained that:  
Accountability means that the State must provide a definition of a 
constitutionally adequate education, the definition must have stan-
dards, and the standards must be subject to meaningful application 
so that it is possible to determine whether, in delegating its obliga-
tion to provide a constitutionally adequate education, the State has 
fulfilled its duty.54  
The Attorney General, who since 1999 has taken the position that the 
Claremont case “mandated” accountability, argued that extant statutes and 
regulations satisfied this “mandate.”55  The Court, however, held that the 
“existing statutory scheme has deficiencies that are inconsistent with the 
State’s duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education.”56  
The Court held that certain education regulations known as the “mini-
mum standards”57 for school approval were “in clear conflict with the 
State’s duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education” to the extent 
they “excuse noncompliance solely based on financial conditions.”58  Ac-
cordingly, to this extent, the minimum standards were deemed “facially 
insufficient.”59  The Court also was critical of the New Hampshire Educa-
  
 52. Claremont IX, 765 A.2d at 677.  
 53. Claremont XI, 794 A.2d at 745. 
 54. Id. at 751. 
 55. Id. at 752.  The Attorney General previously had “characterized Claremont II as issuing four 
mandates: ‘define an adequate education, determine the cost, fund it with constitutional taxes, and 
ensure its delivery through accountability.’” Id. at 749.  Claremont II, however, says nothing about 
either delivery or accountability.  Moreover, as long as adequate funding is being provided, the duty is 
being met.  Therefore, it should not matter constitutionally whether the legislature “determined” the 
cost of an adequate education or picked a number from a hat.  Similarly, as long as an adequate educa-
tion is being provided, it should not matter constitutionally whether it is being delivered through ac-
countability or through UPS.  The court properly chose not to base its holding in Claremont XI on this 
“concession,” as the Attorney General cannot bind the legislature.  Id. at 750-51.  Instead, it reasoned 
that “meaningful” “standards of accountability” were required because “[i]f the State cannot be held 
accountable for fulfilling its duty, the duty creates no obligation and is no longer a duty.”  Id. at 751.  
The manifest problem with this reasoning is that the constitution does hold the representative branches 
accountable for its education policy choices, albeit to the voters not the court, as the legislature and 
governor must stand for reelection every two years.  
 56. Id. at 745. 
 57. N.H. Admin. R. Ann. 306.01 (2006).  The “minimum standards” are minimum only in the sense 
that they are required for State approval for student attendance and state funding.  They are quite exten-
sive and detailed. 
 58. Claremont XI, 794 A.2d at 755.  
 59. Id.  The court had never before used the phrase “facially insufficient” to describe a law or regu-
lation’s constitutional status.  While it sounds like “facially unconstitutional,” it is a completely differ-
ent animal.  A facially unconstitutional challenge to a legislative act is “the most difficult challenge to 
mount successfully” and to succeed “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists 
 
File: Mosca - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 411 Created on:  6/7/2006 11:16:00 PM Last Printed: 6/11/2006 9:19:00 PM 
418 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 3 
tion Improvement and Assessment Program (“NHEIAP”) because the De-
partment of Education “is limited to using the results [of assessment tests] 
to encourage school districts to develop a local education improvement and 
assessment plan,” which the Court felt was not a “meaningful” application 
of assessment tests.60  Borrowing language that had been suggested by the 
Attorney General, the Court “conclud[ed] that the State ‘needs to do more 
work.’ ”61  
In sum, the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 
83 has made the provision of a homogeneous public education through a 
centralized command-and-control system, which has the Supreme Court at 
its helm, the constitutional law of New Hampshire.  
IV. CLAREMONT AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution requires that gov-
ernmental powers be separated between the three branches of government: 
In the government of this state, the three essential powers, to wit, 
the legislative, executive and judicial, ought to be kept as separate 
from, and independent of, each other, as the nature of a free gov-
ernment will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connec-
tion that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indis-
soluble bond of union and amity.62 
  
under which the Act would be valid.”  U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see State v. Brobst, 
857 A.2d 1253, 1255 (N.H. 2004) (discussing overbreadth doctrine).  “Facial insufficiency” appears to 
mean that the challenger simply must show that the law was not written the way the court would have 
written it. 
 60. Claremont XI, 794 A.2d at 758. 
 61. Id. at 759.  The Attorney General’s view of the respective roles of the branches was that the 
representative branches “are responsible for crafting and implementing a long-term solution to the 
problems with the educational funding system found by this Court.  The Court is responsible for decid-
ing whether the Legislature has adopted a satisfactory definition and for determining that the Legisla-
ture has finished its initial tasks under Claremont II, or that it needs to do more work.” Id.  Thus, in the 
view of the Attorney General, the judiciary’s role is to tell the legislature how high to jump, while the 
legislature’s role is to jump that high. 
 62. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 37.  In Claremont V, the court, apparently frustrated that nearly a year had 
passed since the issuance of Claremont II, during which time “the legislature has primarily put its 
efforts into the consideration of legislation (the ABC plan) that was determined to contain an unconsti-
tutional funding mechanism and proposed constitutional amendments designed to nullify in whole or in 
part this court’s decisions in Claremont I and Claremont II,” intimated that the “chain of connection” 
language meant it could act to fund public education in the absence of legislative action.  725 A.2d at 
650, 652.  Such a construction of Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution would be the 
proverbial exception that swallows the rule because by the same reasoning the legislature could exer-
cise judicial powers if it felt the court was not meeting its constitutional duties.  What this language 
refers to is one branch exercising a power that is of a nature that belongs to another branch, where 
expressly provided by the constitution.  One example is Part II, Article 38 of the New Hampshire 
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As the New Hampshire Supreme Court has explained, this “[s]eparation of 
the three co-equal branches of government is essential to protect against a 
seizure of control by one branch that would threaten the ability of our citi-
zens to remain a free and sovereign people.”63 
The Court has utilized the “political question” doctrine developed by 
the federal courts to prevent judicial violation of the separation of pow-
ers.64  Among other circumstances, a case involves a nonjusticiable politi-
cal question “where there is a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judi-
cially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”65 
A. Text and Structure 
If the separation of powers means anything, it means that one branch 
of government cannot exercise powers that are textually committed by the 
constitution to another branch.  Yet that is exactly what a judicially en-
forceable duty to provide an adequate education and provide adequate 
funding entails, because the constitution commits these matters to the rep-
resentative branches.  
The “power of the purse” is textually committed to the legislature as 
the constitution gives only the legislature the power to raise taxes,66 and 
only money that the legislature has appropriated can be spent.67  In general, 
it has long been understood that, under the separation of powers, when and 
how to exercise the “power of the purse” is exclusively a legislative call.68  
Indeed, that is one of the reasons why some have seen fit to refer to the 
judiciary as the “least dangerous branch.”69   
  
Constitution, which provides that the senate “shall be a court” for impeachments.  N.H. Const. pt. II, 
art. 38; see also The Federalist No. 47, 249 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan 
eds., 2001).  
 63. In re Governor and Exec. Council, 846 A.2d 1148, 1154 (N.H. 2004) (quoting In re Mone, 719 
A.2d 626, 631 (N.H. 1998). 
 64. Baines, 876 A.2d at 774-75 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962)). 
 65. Hughes, 876 A.2d at 743 (quoting In re Judicial Conduct Comm., 751 A.2d 514, 516 (N.H. 
2000)). 
 66. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 28; N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 5. 
 67. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 56. 
 68. See Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 35 Harv. J. on Legis. 
297, 300 (1988) (“The Framers’ decision to invest the Legislative Branch with the control over the 
purse was neither arbitrary nor novel.  Rather, in assigning the Legislature the power of the purse, the 
Framers were relying on their familiarity with the lessons of Roman, English, and colonial history; with 
the history of the American states prior to the adoption of the Constitution; and with English and conti-
nental political theory.”). 
 69. See The Federalist No. 78, supra n. 62 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Whoever attentively considers 
the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated 
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the 
political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.  The 
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court has recognized that the separation 
of powers would be violated if the judiciary were to attempt to require the 
legislature to make a particular type of appropriation.  Indeed, only eight 
years prior to Claremont I, the Court had held that Part I, Article 18, which 
in relevant part provides that the “true design of all punishments being to 
reform, not to exterminate mankind,” did not authorize the superior court 
to order the State to provide a college education to a State prison inmate.70  
Rather, the “superior court exceeded its jurisdiction” because, in part, the 
judiciary “cannot violate the separation of powers by invading the right of 
the legislature to appropriate money for prison programs. . . .”71  
Any remedy for an alleged deprivation of “adequate funding” would 
require a court to order the State to spend money that the legislature has 
not appropriated, which would violate Part II, Article 56.72  Thus, there 
cannot be a judicially enforceable duty to provide adequate funding.   
The power to make education policy is just as obviously textually 
committed to the legislative branch.  The constitution vests the “supreme 
legislative power” in the legislature,73 and gives the legislature “full power 
and authority” to make laws.74  Consequently, to use the Supreme Court’s 
own words, “[a]ny educational policy or rule declared by the legislature or 
promulgated under authority delegated by it may not be reversed or va-
cated judicially on the ground that it must be regarded as impolitic.”75 
Yet that is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Claremont II, 
when it struck down a definition of educational adequacy developed by the 
State Board of Education.  The Court contended that it struck down the 
State Board’s definition because the definition did not “sufficiently reflect 
the letter or spirit of the State Constitution’s mandate.”76  However, the 
  
Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community.  The legislature not 
only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to 
be regulated.  The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no 
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution what-
ever.  It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”). 
 70. State v. Evans, 506 A.2d 695, 697 (1985) (quoting N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 18).  
 71. Id. at 699.  The court also ruled that judiciary could not violate the separation of powers by 
invading “the right of the executive to devise and implement rehabilitative and educational programs at 
the State prison.”  Id. 
 72. See N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 56.  “No moneys shall be issued out of the treasury of this state, and 
disposed of, (except such sums as may be appropriated for the redemption of bills of credit, or treas-
urer’s notes, or for the payment of interest arising thereon) but by warrant under the hand of the gover-
nor for the time being, by and with the advice and consent of the council, for the necessary support and 
defense of this state, and for the necessary protection and preservation of the inhabitants thereof, 
agreeably to the acts and resolves of the general court.” Id. 
 73. N.H. Const. pt, II, art. 2. 
 74. Id. at art. 5. 
 75. Coleman v. School Dist. of Rochester, 183 A. 586, 589 (N.H. 1936).  
 76. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1357.  
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Court did not explain what it was about the definition that was not suffi-
ciently reflective of the constitutional mandate except that “in the first in-
stance, it is the legislature’s obligation, not that of individual members of 
the board of education, to establish educational standards that comply with 
constitutional requirements.”77  This explanation is unconvincing. 
For one thing, the Court’s precedent established that it was constitu-
tional for the legislature to delegate authority to administrative agencies, 
such as the Board of Education, as long as it provided “some standards or 
general policy to guide the administrative agency. . . .”78  The Court sug-
gested that the authority to define educational adequacy could not similarly 
be delegated because the “constitution places the duty to support the public 
schools ‘on the legislators and magistrates.’”79  But that simply begs the 
question why the legislature did not have the discretion to carry out its duty 
by delegating to the State Board the authority to define “adequacy.”  Addi-
tionally, under this reasoning, the legislature should be prohibited from 
delegating any aspect of the duty to provide an adequate education, which 
as later Claremont decisions make clear, is not the case.80   
For another thing, if the problem was that the legislature could not 
delegate the task of defining educational adequacy, then the Court did not 
need to “look to” the Kentucky parameters, as all that the representative 
branches would need to do to meet their “obligation” “to establish educa-
tional standards that comply with constitutional requirements,”81 would be 
to directly enact the Board of Education’s definition or another definition.  
The conclusion that the Supreme Court simply wanted to define adequacy 
itself is inescapable.  
This conclusion is further supported by the language of Part II, Article 
83.  As noted earlier, there is no mention of any qualitative standard of 
education.  Rather, the duty is simply to “cherish the interest of literature 
and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools. . . .”82  A very 
strong case can be made that this language is hortatory.83  At best, this lan-
guage is what commentators call “Category I” constitutional language,84 
  
 77. Id. at 1358.  
 78. In re Strandell, 562 A.2d 173, 178 (N.H. 1989). 
 79. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1357 (quoting N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 83). 
 80. See Claremont XI, 794 A.2d at 751 (standards of accountability must allow the Court “to deter-
mine whether, in delegating its obligation to provide a constitutionally adequate education, the State 
has fulfilled its duty”). 
 81. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1358. 
 82. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 83.  
 83. See Van Loan, supra n 8. 
 84. See Thro, supra n. 12, at 605-06 (“In some states, ‘Category I’ clauses impose a legislative duty 
which is met by simply establishing a public school system.  In other states, ‘Category II’ clauses 
require that the system be of a specific quality or have some characteristic such as ‘uniformity.’  The 
‘Category III’ education clauses go beyond the specific quality level of Category II and set up the 
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and “merely mandate[s] some system of free public schools with no re-
quirement as to support or quality.”85  But whether the language is horta-
tory or mandatory, it is impossible to read as requiring the multifarious 
“guidelines” enumerated in Claremont II.  Instead, such a reading can 
fairly be described as “a display of stunning judicial imagination.”86 
Claremont II’s holding that it was unconstitutional to use the local 
property tax to fund an adequate education was also politically based.  
Whether the tax was constitutional depended upon how the taxing district 
was delineated.87  If it was delineated as the school district, as the trial 
court had defined it, then the rate and assessment would be uniform, and 
the tax would be constitutional.  On the other hand, if the taxing district 
was delineated as the entire State, as the Supreme Court delineated it, then 
the tax would be unconstitutional because rates and assessments varied 
between school districts. 
Because the purpose of the local property tax was to meet the State’s 
duty to provide an adequate education, the Supreme Court reasoned that it 
was a State tax.88  Again, the problem with this reasoning is that it is purely 
results oriented as it offers no satisfactory explanation why the State can 
delegate other aspects of its educational duties, but not the funding aspect.  
It also fails to explain why various other duties that the State delegates to 
municipalities can be funded with local property taxes when, in theory, 
they are also State duties.89    
Another problem with this reasoning is that it is inconsistent with how 
the Court had described the State’s funding duty in Claremont I.  There, 
the Court said that the duty was to “guarantee adequate funding,”90 which 
  
school system for a specific purpose.  Finally, in the few states with ‘Category IV’ clauses, education is 
the ‘primary,’ ‘fundamental’ or ‘paramount’ duty of the state legislature.”).  Note that Thro incorrectly 
classifies New Hampshire as a Category IV state as there is no language in Part II, Article 83 describ-
ing public education as a “primary,” “fundamental” or “paramount” duty.  Id. at 606.  Thro, however, 
correctly describes the Massachusetts education clause (which is a “nearly identical provision regarding 
education,” Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378) as a Category I clause, “which cannot be regarded as 
imposing a quality standard.”  Thro, supra n. 12, at 611.   
 85. Jon Mills & Timothy McLendon, Setting a New Standard for Public Education: Revision 6 
Increases the Duty of the State to Make “Adequate Provision” for Florida Schools, 52 Fla. L. Rev. 
329, 344 (2000).   
 86. Hancock v. Commr. of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1160 (Mass. 2005) (Cowin, J., concurring). 
 87. See Susan E. Marshall, The New Hampshire State Constitution: A Reference Guide 121 (Praeger 
2004) (“The legislative authority to impose taxes is limited by the constitutional requirement that they 
be ‘reasonable and proportional.’  Reasonable and proportional taxes are equal in valuation and uni-
form in rate. . . .  To have a uniform valuation and uniform rate, a tax must be uniform throughout the 
taxing district, so that a state tax must be uniform throughout the state, a county tax throughout the 
county, and a town tax throughout the town.”) (citations omitted). 
 88. Compare Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1356, with Holt v. Antrim, 9 A. 389, 389 (N.H. 1886) (“Lo-
cal education is a local purpose for which legislative power may be delegated to towns.”). 
 89. See Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1363 (Horton, J., dissenting).  
 90. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1376. 
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connotes a role where the State, acting as a guarantor, would assure that 
less affluent school districts have sufficient funding, as opposed to paying 
for the entire cost of an adequate education in all school districts.  Thus, 
the Supreme Court, in order to strike down the extant education funding 
system, changed the nature of the State’s duty from the guarantor of ade-
quate funding to its exclusive provider.91    
It is not just the constitution’s delineation of governmental powers that 
compels the conclusion that education policymaking is textually committed 
to the representative branches.  Article 83 does so as well as it makes the 
duty one for “the legislators and magistrates.”92  If the language “shall be 
the duty . . . to cherish” is no mere statement of aspiration, but “commands, 
in no uncertain terms,”93 then it necessarily follows that the language “shall 
be the duty of the legislators and magistrates” commands every bit as un-
equivocally “that the duty be fulfilled by the legislative and executive 
branches, without oversight or intrusion by the judiciary.”94   
Despite the clear textual commitment of education policymaking to the 
legislature, the Supreme Court has, under the guise of interpreting the con-
stitution, played the role of a “super” legislature from the outset.  While 
Claremont I’s declination to “define the parameters of the education man-
dated by the constitution”95 may sound like deference to the representative 
branches, it is not. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Article 83 “imposes on the 
State a duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every child 
in the public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee adequate fund-
ing,”96 it nonetheless is quite an interpretive leap to conclude that this duty 
requires that State government define an adequate education, and that it 
define adequacy in a one-size-fits-all manner.  For example, it is certainly 
arguable that a more efficacious way to develop the parameters of a quality 
of public education is by letting school districts function as laboratories of 
  
 91. See also Claremont IX, 765 A.2d at 677 (stating that it is “the State’s obligation to underwrite 
the cost of an adequate education for each educable child”).  The hostility of the Supreme Court to 
property taxes in general can be seen in Claremont X, where the Court came within one vote of declar-
ing the statewide property tax unconstitutional.  See 780 A.2d 494.  
 92. See N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 41 (referring to Governor as “supreme executive magistrate”). 
 93. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378. 
 94. Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1160 (Cowin, J., concurring).  There are other examples that demon-
strate that the Court’s treatment of the language of Part II, Article 83 has been inconsistent.  For exam-
ple, it is not just public schools that the legislators and magistrates have a duty to “cherish” but “semi-
naries” and “the interest of literature and the sciences.”  N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 83.  Yet the Court has 
given no effect to this language.  The reason cannot be that the language is too ambiguous because the 
Court previously stated that the framers understood seminaries to mean colleges.  See Sisters of Mercy 
v. Town of Hooksett, 42 A.2d 222, 225 (N.H. 1945). 
 95. See Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1381 (declining to define educational parameters because “that 
task is, in the first instance, for the legislature and the Governor”). 
 96. Id. at 1376. 
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education policy and develop their own separate definitions97 or by letting 
market forces do so through school choice.98 
Telling the representative branches that they have the “task” of defin-
ing an adequate education, in a decision purporting to interpret the consti-
tution, is simply an insidious way of ordering the legislature to pass a cer-
tain type of legislation.  If the text of the constitution means anything, 
however, it is the legislature’s call as to what level of government should 
be responsible for defining an adequate education and indeed whether there 
should be a governmental definition of an adequate education at all.  While 
the Court’s declination in Claremont I to “define the parameters of the 
education mandated by the constitution” may sound like deference to the 
representative branches, it is not. 
The representative branches’ compliance with Claremont I embold-
ened the Court.  In Claremont II, the Court struck down the State Board of 
Education’s definition, announced its own “general, aspirational guidelines 
for defining educational adequacy,” and indicated that it anticipated the 
representative branches “will promptly develop and adopt specific criteria 
implementing these guidelines. . . .”99  Thus, the legislature’s role had been 
reduced to implementing a program of public education that reflected the 
Court’s policy views.   
Subsequent cases involved increased judicial micro-managing of edu-
cation policy.  In Claremont IX, even though the definition of an adequate 
education was not before it, the Court opined that the legislative definition, 
which essentially codified the Claremont II guidelines, was insufficient, 
and indicated that the definition should be written at a level of detail from 
which its cost could be determined.100  In Claremont XI, the Court held that 
the duty to provide an adequate education required “standards of account-
ability.”101  Because the extant statutes and regulations were not suffi-
ciently “meaningful,”102 the State “need[ed] to do more work,”103 which is 
a fetching euphemism for rewriting the minimum standards and the 
NHEIAP to the Court’s liking.  
  
 97. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50 (“An analogy to the Nation-State relationship in our federal 
system seems uniquely appropriate.  Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths of 
our form of government each State’s freedom to ‘serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments.’  No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints 
and from a diversity of approaches than does public education.”) (citation omitted). 
 98. See Jennifer L. Smith, Educational Vouchers in Indiana – Considering the Federal and State 
Constitutional Issues, 34 Val. U. L. Rev. 275 (1999). 
 99. 703 A.2d at 1359. 
 100. 765 A.2d at 677. 
 101. 794 A.2d at 745. 
 102. Id. at 758. 
 103. Id. at 759. 
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Critiquing the legislature in this manner is clearly beyond the scope of 
how the Supreme Court had previously characterized judicial review, 
which simply “authorizes courts to determine whether a law is constitu-
tional, not whether it is necessary or useful.”104  Thus, the court “simply 
compares the legislative act with the constitution; [and] since the constitu-
tion clearly cannot be adjudged void, the courts have no choice but to de-
clare any act which is inconsistent with it to be of no effect.”105 
While one would never know it from reading the Claremont case, there 
are differences of opinion regarding how best to improve public education.  
The divide is political not legal.  Those on the conservative side of the po-
litical spectrum typically favor the principle of subsidiarity, which pushes 
decision making down to the lowest possible level.106  Accordingly, school 
districts, rather than the State, should run public schools, while parents 
should be able to choose their children’s schools.107  Those on the liberal 
side of the political spectrum typically favor centralization of education 
policy and oppose school choice.108  Interpreting Article 83 to require a 
single definition of educational adequacy for the entire State and uniform 
standards of accountability is simply a political judgment, that centralized 
bureaucratic control of public education is better policy than local control 
and school choice, camouflaged as constitutional law. 
The structure of the constitution also belies the assertion that Article 83 
imposes any judicially enforceable duty on state government to provide an 
adequate education.  Part I, the Bill of Rights, specifically enumerates limi-
tations on governmental power.  To name a few examples, government 
cannot take away our firearms,109 prevent us from exercising the religion of 
our choice,110 take our property without just compensation,111 or prevent us 
  
 104. State v. LaFrance, 471 A.2d 340, 343 (N.H. 1983). 
 105. Id.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (“So if a law be in opposition to the consti-
tution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide 
the case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, 
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.  This 
is of the very essence of judicial duty.”). 
 106. See N.H. Republican St. Comm., 2005-2006 Republican Party Platform, http://www.nhgop.org/ 
resources/platform.html#edu (“Local control of education policy and education funding creates the 
best-managed school systems.”) (accessed May 22, 2006). 
 107. See id. (“Laws should be implemented to encourage school choice and competition and allow all 
parents to choose the best public, private, charter or home school program for their children.”). 
 108. See N.H. Democratic Party, 2004 New Hampshire Democratic Party Platform, 
http://www.nhdp.org/platform/platform.asp#EDUCATION (“We believe in the primacy of public 
education and oppose attempts to reduce the public commitment to all schools. . . .  We require that the 
State Board of Education develop policies for the benefit of local boards that outline our collective 
concept of adequacy in public education.”) (platform is no longer available on the listed website and a 
copy of the original website is on file with the Pierce Law Review). 
 109. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 2-a. 
 110. Id. at art. 5. 
 111. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 12. 
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from ventilating our opinions.112  Part II, the Form of Government, in con-
trast, divides governmental powers between the three branches without 
specifically enumerating how to exercise those powers.113   
Moreover, it expressly provides that the legislature has “full power and 
authority” to make “all manner of wholesome and reasonable” laws “as 
they may judge for the benefit and welfare of this state.”114  The Supreme 
Court has construed this language to mean that “courts may not declare 
acts of the Legislature void on the sole issue whether they are ‘wholesome 
and reasonable.’  The Legislature is to judge whether they are for ‘the 
benefit and welfare’ of the state.”115  It would be incongruous with this 
structure, which precludes some governmental actions but does not require 
any actions, leaving it to the branch most responsive to the people to de-
termine what is for “the benefit and welfare of this state,” to interpret Arti-
cle 83 to impose a judicially enforceable duty on the legislature to design 
and implement a curriculum based on qualitative guidelines provided by 
the Supreme Court and to enact and utilize “standards of accountability” 
that the Court deems “meaningful.” 
B. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards 
Another characteristic exhibited by cases that involve nonjusticiable 
political questions is “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards” for resolving the question.116  The need for such standards in 
adequacy litigation is obvious as courts must determine what level of edu-
cation is adequate and how much funding is necessary to reach that level.  
Perhaps the biggest problem a court attempting to develop such standards 
faces is that the relationship between school performance and funding is 
hardly the self-evident proposition that the Claremont case, and adequacy 
doctrine in general, assumes.  Rather, “there are significant theoretical and 
empirical disputes as to the importance of finance in the delivery of a qual-
ity education.”117 
  
 112. Id. at art. 22. 
 113. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 2 (legislative power); id. at art. 41 (executive power); id. at art. 72-a 
(judicial power).  
 114. Id. at art. 5. 
 115. Coleman, 183 A. at 586.   
 116. Hughes, 876 A.2d at 743. 
 117. Obhof, supra n. 27, at 595; see also W. Lance Conn, Funding Fundamentals: The Cost/Quality 
Debate in School Finance Reform, 94 Educ. L. Rep. 9, 10 (1994) (“Despite over two hundred studies in 
nearly thirty years, educational researchers have not yet shown convincingly that school expenditures 
are related to educational achievement in any systematic way.”); see generally Michael Heise, The 
Courts, Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Policy 633, 656 n. 
148 (2002) (collecting articles). 
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Perhaps the paradigmatic example that it is not just love, but adequacy 
as well, that money cannot buy is the Missouri v. Jenkins desegregation 
case.118  The United States District Court, since 1985, had issued remedial 
orders designed to desegregate the Kansas City Missouri School District by 
creating “magnet schools” to attract white students.119  The “massive ex-
penditures” ordered by the District Court financed, among other things, air-
conditioned classrooms, a 2,000-square-foot planetarium, green houses and 
vivariums, a twenty five-acre farm with an air-conditioned meeting room 
for one hundred and four people, a Model United Nations wired for lan-
guage translation, broadcast capable radio and television studios with an 
editing and animation lab, a temperature controlled art gallery, movie edit-
ing and screening rooms, a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics 
room, 1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for use in a zoo 
project, and swimming pools.120  The per pupil cost far exceeded the costs 
in any other school district in Missouri.121  Yet “student achievement levels 
were still at or below national norms at many grade levels.”122  Mercifully 
for the taxpayers of Missouri, in 1995 the United States Supreme Court put 
an end to the District Court’s spending spree.123 
Nevertheless, various “cost studies” have been developed to determine 
the cost of an adequate education.124  A majority of states, including New 
Hampshire, have undertaken such studies voluntarily in response to educa-
tion funding litigation.125  In a few states, the studies were ordered by the 
courts.126  The most popular types of cost studies are “professional judg-
ment” and “successful schools.”127   
Professional judgment is just that, as it defines the cost of an adequate 
education as what “experts” believe it costs to provide either their own 
  
 118. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 119. Id. at 76-77. 
 120. Id. at 79. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 100 (internal quotation omitted). 
 123. Id. at 102-03. 
 124. See e.g. James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School Finance Litiga-
tion: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 463, 475 (2004) (“[R]eliance on 
costing-out studies promises to be one of the most important trends in school finance litigation over the 
next decade.”); Steve Smith, Education Adequacy Litigation: History, Trends, and Research, 27 UALR 
L. Rev. 107, 114 (2004) (“[W]ith courts across the country finding education systems unconstitutional, 
the next logical step was to create some type of rationale or methodology to determine adequate fund-
ing levels”). 
 125. See generally Campaign for Educ. Equity, Costing Out, http://www.schoolfunding.info/policy/ 
CostingOut/overview.php3 (accessed May 22, 2006) (providing background on the response to cost-
based educational equity litigation) (original website on file with the Pierce Law Review). 
 126. Id.  These states were Arizona, Arkansas, New York, Ohio and Wyoming.  Id. 
 127. Janet D. McDonald et al., School Finance Litigation and Adequacy Studies, 27 UALR L. Rev. 
69, 93 (2004); Ryan & Saunders, supra n. 124, at 476-77. 
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vision of an adequate education, State standards, or some other measure.128  
Successful schools studies define the cost of an adequate education as av-
erage spending among schools or school districts meeting selected bench-
marks.129  Despite the multiplicity of approaches, what all cost studies have 
in common is that they are completely arbitrary. 
Consider the initial education funding law passed in response to 
Claremont II.130  It was based on a cost study prepared by Augenblick & 
Myers, Inc. using the successful schools approach.131  The study identified 
school districts in which forty to sixty percent of the third and sixth grade 
students had proficiency ratings of “Basic” or better on the State’s stan-
dardized NHEIAP tests.132  The sample was then reduced to the school 
districts that accounted for the fifty percent of the students with the lowest 
base costs,133 which was defined as per pupil expenditure less costs for 
special education, summer school, all costs reimbursed by federal funds, 
and various other costs.134  The per pupil cost of an adequate education was 
calculated based on the average base cost among these school districts.135  
In 1999 this number was $3,669.00.136  This figure was then reduced by a 
9.75 percent discount factor to produce a $3,311.00 per pupil cost of an 
adequate education, which was used to determine the amount of State 
funding.137 
  
 128. Deborah A. Verstegen, Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The Continuing Saga of Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to School Finance Systems, 23  
St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 499, 503 (2004). 
 129. R. Craig Wood & Bruce D. Baker, An Examination and Analysis of the Equity and Adequacy 
Concepts of Constitutional Challenges to State Education Finance Distribution Formulas, 27 UALR  
L. Rev. 125, 145 (2004). 
 130. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 198:40 (1999) (repealed 2005). 
 131. 1998 N.H. Laws 321 (Chapter 267:1); see Campaign for Educ. Equity, New Hampshire Fact 
Sheet, http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/nh/costingout_nh.php3 (accessed May 22, 2006) (outlining 
the calculations and recommendations of the study) (original website on file with the Pierce Law Re-
view).  
 132. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 198:40(I)(b)(1) (repealed 2005).  The NHEIAP ranks students in one of 
four categories: Novice, Basic, Proficient, or Advanced.  N.H. Dept. of Educ., NHEIAP FAQ, 
http://www.ed.state.nh.us/education/doe/organization/curriculum/Assessment/nheiapFAQs.htm (ac-
cessed May 22, 2006) (original website on file with the Pierce Law Review).  Districts where more than 
sixty percent of the students scored at the Basic or better levels were excluded on the ground that they 
were providing more than an adequate education, while districts where fewer than forty percent of the 
students scored Basic or better were excluded on the ground that they were not providing an adequate 
education.  Douglas E. Hall & Richard A. Minard, Jr., Plumbing the Numbers #7 School Finance 
Reform: Trends & Unintended Consequences 5 (N.H. Ctr. for Pub. Policy Stud. April 2003) (also 
available at http://www.unh.edu/nhcpps/plumbing/plumbing7.pdf). 
 133. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 198:40(I)(b)(2) (repealed 2005).  
 134. Id. at § 198:40(I)(a) (repealed 2005). 
 135. Id. at § 198:40(I)(b)(3) (repealed 2005). 
 136. Hall & Minard, supra n. 132, at 5. 
 137. Id. at 7. 
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In Claremont VII, the plaintiffs urged the Supreme Court to write the 
9.75 percent discount factor out of the formula because it lacked a “suffi-
cient legal basis.”138  The plaintiffs were correct about the pedigree of the 
discount factor as it was a plug by the legislature to keep the total cost of 
an adequate education at $825 million.139  But under that standard of re-
view every other component of the formula could be found wanting as 
well.  The definition of base cost, the choice of the NHEIAP tests, the 
choice of the “Basic” proficiency rating, and the selection of school dis-
tricts where forty to sixty percent of students score at “Basic” or better are 
also not legally based. 
For example, the only answer to why the sample should be school dis-
tricts where forty to sixty percent of students score at “Basic” or better on 
the NHEIAP tests is that an “expert” says so.  What is a court to do then 
when such a cost study is challenged as unconstitutional and a different 
expert testifies that in order to determine the cost of an adequate education 
the sample should be school districts where fifty to seventy percent of stu-
dents score at or above “Proficient,” or that base cost should be defined 
differently, or that a professional judgment study showed that per pupil 
expenditures should be $8,000.00 higher?140  There certainly is no legal 
standard to guide the court. 
Another shared attribute of cost studies is that they are unreliable be-
cause they ignore the numerous other variables affecting education per-
formance besides funding, such as the competence of administrators, the 
quality of teachers, the talents and motivations of students, and the in-
volvement of parents.141  Because of these variables, the cost of an ade-
quate education necessarily varies not just by school district or by school 
but by student.  Accordingly, in order to reliably calculate the cost of an 
  
 138. 744 A.2d at 1108. 
 139. Hall & Minard, supra n. 132, at 7 n. 3. 
 140. A study relied on by the plaintiffs at the trial court level in the Massachusetts Hancock case 
argued that the per pupil cost of an adequate education was $13,000, which was nearly $8,000 higher 
than spending in one of the target school districts.  Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll, 2004 WL 
877984 at *121 (Mass. Super. 2004).  The trial court did not find the study “helpful” because it repre-
sented “to some extent a wish list of resources that teachers and administrators would like to have if 
they were creating an ideal school with no need to think about cost at all” and because “the context in 
which this study was conducted – a lawsuit involving funding issues for the very districts in which the 
panel members teach and work – gives one pause about its total objectivity.”  Id. 
 141. See Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2417, 2446 
(2004) (“[W]hat is reasonably clear is that something as complex as student academic achievement 
almost assuredly does not pivot on any single variable, such as funding, teacher quality, racial composi-
tion, or class size.”); see also Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good 
Policy, 28 Harv. J. on Legis. 423, 438 (1991) (“[T]he aggregate data provided by the 187 separate 
estimates lead relentlessly to the conclusion that, after family backgrounds and other educational inputs 
are considered, differences in educational expenditures are not systematically related to student per-
formance.”). 
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adequate education, the calculation must be done on a student-by-student 
basis and the calculation must account for the particular effect of non-
financial variables on each student’s performance.  Until somebody comes 
up with a cost study that does so, the best that can be said about cost stud-
ies is that they provide equal State funding per student. 
But even if the cost of an adequate education could be determined, 
education funding is not something that can be considered in isolation be-
cause education is just one of many services that State and local govern-
ment provide.  There are no judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for determining how much of the State’s budget can be devoted to 
public education without compromising the ability of State and local gov-
ernment to enforce environmental regulations, maintain public health pro-
grams, or provide for the public safety, to name just a few examples.142  
Thus, education funding is an issue that belongs in the Statehouse, not the 
courtroom. 
There also are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
determining what level of education is an adequate education.  Ironically, 
the Claremont case illustrates that the question is thoroughly political. 
Claremont I seemed to hold out some hope that the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court would leave the making of education policy to the legisla-
ture to a greater degree than other state supreme courts which had also held 
that their states’ constitutions imposed duties to provide and fund an ade-
quate education.  Unlike these courts, which immediately proceeded to 
define educational adequacy,143 the Claremont I court declined to “define 
the parameters of the education mandated by the constitution as that task 
is, in the first instance, for the legislature and the Governor.”144  Of course, 
which branch would control education policy would hinge upon what the 
Supreme Court intended to do “in the second instance.”  On the one hand, 
if the court’s review were restricted to determining whether the definition 
is “inadequate,” for example, a thirty percent literacy rate,145 then the legis-
  
 142. Education funding litigation seeks to override the political process by imposing a higher value 
on education spending than on other government spending.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts recently refused to hold that the Commonwealth was under-funding education “[b]ecause deci-
sions about where scarce public money will do the most good are laden with value judgments, those 
decisions are best left to our elected representatives.” Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1156. 
 143. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212-13; McDuffy v. Sec. of the Exec. Off. of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 
(Mass. 1993).  Note that in Hancock the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts backed away from 
using the Kentucky “capabilities” as the lodestar for whether the Commonwealth was providing an 
adequate education.  822 N.E.2d at 1153.  Rather, “McDuffy . . . did not mandate any particular pro-
gram of public education, [and the] seven ‘capabilities’ listed in Rose do not in themselves prescribe a 
specific curriculum.” Id. 
 144. 635 A.2d at 1381. 
 145. Cf. Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 409 (Overton, J., concurring) (“While ‘adequate’ may be difficult to 
quantify, certainly a minimum threshold exists below which the funding provided by the legislature 
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lature would retain the primary role in setting education policy.146  If, on 
the other hand, the review were to involve determining whether the legisla-
tive definition of adequacy is, well, adequate, then the court would be at 
large in the field of education policy and the branches’ roles would be re-
versed. 
Claremont II’s “aspirational guidelines” made it clear that henceforth 
the Supreme Court intended to take the primary role in setting education 
policy.147  Justice Horton, who had been part of the unanimous Claremont I 
decision, dissented because, “[m]y problem is that I was not appointed to 
establish educational policy, nor to determine the proper way to finance the 
implementation of this policy.  Those duties, in my opinion, reside with the 
representatives of the people.”148   
Horton argued that the majority had defined “general adequacy” when 
all that Part II, Article 83 required was “Constitutional adequacy.”149  The 
former was a question to be left to the political branches because “it is 
clear that one man’s adequacy is another’s deficiency.”150  Reasoning that 
the scope of the duty was coterminous with the purpose of Part II, Article 
83, and that the purpose was found in the language, “the preservation of a 
free government,” Horton concluded that there is constitutional adequacy 
“if the education provided meets the minimum necessary to assure the 
preservation of a free government.”151  He then proceeded to define “con-
stitutional adequacy” as “reading, writing, and mathematics . . . exposure 
to history and the form of our government, [and] the first three elements of 
the Kentucky standard adopted by the majority, but not necessarily the 
balance.”152 
The majority, of course, had a different take on things.  “We agree 
with Justice Horton that we were not appointed to establish educational 
policy. . . .  That is why we leave such matters, consistent with the Consti-
  
would be considered ‘inadequate.’  For example, were a complaint to assert that a county in this state 
has a thirty percent illiteracy rate, I would suggest that such a complaint has at least stated a cause of 
action under our education provision.”). 
 146. While this approach makes the court’s role critic, as opposed to chef, it still does not provide a 
manageable standard of review because inadequacy, like pornography, would depend on the eye of the 
beholder.  See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[U]nder the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornog-
raphy.  I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced 
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I 
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”).  
 147. 703 A.2d at 1359. 
 148. Id. at 1361 (Horton, J., dissenting).   
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1362. 
 152. Id. at 1361-62. 
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tution, to the two co-equal branches of government.”153  The majority’s 
rebuttal, at best, simply assumes what needs to be proven.154  Moreover, it 
is belied by their “aspirational guidelines,” which leave the legislature no 
room to establish education policy.155  Rather, all that is left is for the legis-
lature to “promptly develop and adopt specific criteria implementing these 
guidelines.”156  
While Horton criticizes the majority for setting education policy, his 
approach represents a difference in degree, not in kind, from the major-
ity’s.  Limiting the scope of the duty to providing the education “necessary 
to assure the preservation of a free government” may theoretically reduce 
the number of potential answers to the question, what is an adequate edu-
cation, but it does not convert that question from a political question into a 
legal question.   
For example, Horton “would include in the constitutional standard the 
first three elements of the Kentucky standard adopted by the majority, but 
not necessarily the balance.”157  But whether knowledge of economics 
(element two) is more important to the preservation of a free government 
than knowledge of the arts (element five) is a matter of opinion.  
Additionally, the Kentucky criteria contain other elements that might 
be deemed necessary to the preservation of a free government.  For exam-
ple, one might reasonably believe that “vocational training” is as necessary 
to preserving a free government as “written communication skills.”  And 
one might reasonably believe that skills that do not appear in the Kentucky 
criteria – such as sufficient physical fitness to serve in the armed forces – 
are essential to preserving a free government.158  Just as “one man’s ade-
quacy is another’s deficiency,” what type of education is “the minimum 
necessary to preserve a free government” is also a matter of opinion.  Both 
are political questions. 
Ironically, the majority’s description of the nature of an adequate pub-
lic education shows how political the question is:  
A constitutionally adequate public education is not a static concept 
removed from the demands of an evolving world.  It is not the 
  
 153. Id. at 1360 (majority). 
 154. Note that the majority’s profession of deference to the representative branches is qualified by the 
phrase “consistent with the Constitution,” which the majority had just interpreted to require the repre-
sentative branches to “develop and adopt specific criteria implementing” the Kentucky guidelines.  Id. 
at 1359. 
 155. See id. (defining “educational adequacy” according to the Kentucky “aspirational guidelines”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1362 (Horton, J., dissenting). 
 158. See e.g. Paul Cartledge, The Spartans 32 (Overlook Press 2003) (discussing the Agoge, the 
system of compulsory education in Sparta). 
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needs of the few but the critical requirements of the many that it 
must address.  Mere competence in the basics – reading, writing, 
and arithmetic – is insufficient in the waning days of the twentieth 
century to insure that this State’s public school students are fully 
integrated into the world around them.  A broad exposure to the 
social, economic, scientific, technological, and political realities of 
today’s society is essential for our students to compete, contribute, 
and flourish in the twenty-first century.159   
If an “adequate public education is not a static concept removed from the 
demands of an evolving world,”160 which I agree it is not, then whether the 
public schools are providing an adequate education is not something that 
judges can discover by recourse to the text of the constitution, the Supreme 
Court’s precedents,161 or history.162  Rather, it is a question of policy to be 
answered by the elected branches.163 
Of the three branches of government, the judiciary is the least institu-
tionally suited to adjusting education policy to “the demands of an evolv-
ing world.”  The judiciary must wait for the appropriate lawsuit to set edu-
cation policy.  The legislature, in contrast, is able to change education pol-
icy as often as necessary.  And while a judge only gets to hear the views of 
the litigants’ “experts,” the legislature can listen to anyone it thinks might 
be helpful.  If it “is not the needs of the few but the critical requirements of 
the many that [an adequate education] must address,”164 then the body 
  
 159. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359. 
 160. Id. 
 161. If anything, precedent indicates that the constitution does not impose a judicially enforceable 
duty upon the State to provide and fund an adequate education.  See Fogg v. Bd. of Educ., 82 A. 173, 
174-75 (N.H. 1912) (“The primary purpose of the maintenance of the common school system is the 
promotion of the general intelligence of the people constituting the body politic and thereby to increase 
the usefulness and efficiency of the citizens, upon which the government of society depends.  Free 
schooling furnished by the state is not so much a right granted to the pupils as a duty imposed upon 
them for the public good.”); Holt, 9 A. at 389 (“Local education is a local purpose for which legislative 
power may be delegated to towns.”). 
 162. History also indicates that the constitution does not impose a judicially enforceable duty upon 
the State to provide and fund an adequate education.  As the Supreme Court noted in Claremont I, “no 
State funding was provided at all for education in the first fifty years after ratification of the constitu-
tion.”  635 A.2d at 1381; see also Walter A. Backofen, Claremont’s Achilles’ Heel: The Unrecognized 
Mandatory School-Tax Law of 1789, 43-1 N.H. B. J. 26 (Mar. 2002) (discussing the Law of 1789, in 
effect until 1919, which provided neither equal nor adequate funding for public schools). 
 163. See Marrero, 739 A.2d at 112 (“The Constitution ‘makes it impossible for a legislature to set up 
an educational policy which future legislatures cannot change’ because ‘the very essence of this section 
is to enable successive legislatures to adopt a changing program to keep abreast of educational ad-
vances.’  It would be no less contrary to the ‘essence’ of the Constitutional provision for this Court to 
bind future Legislatures and school boards to a present judicial view of a constitutionally required 
‘normal’ program of educational services.  It is only through free experimentation that the best possible 
educational services can be achieved.”). 
 164. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359.  I cannot help pointing out that the “[i]t is not the needs of the 
few but the critical requirements of the many” language sounds a lot like Mr. Spock’s last words to 
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elected by and regularly accountable to the many, the legislature, is its 
logical expositor.165  
Ironically, the crown jewel of the Claremont case, its “standards of ac-
countability,” illustrates why judges should leave education policymaking 
to the representative branches.  The legislature will not be able to use stan-
dards to generate improvement by purposefully making standards hard, or 
even impossible, to achieve without running the risk that schools will be 
deemed inadequate for not attaining such standards.  Consequently, 
Claremont may well result in lower standards and a lower level of educa-
tion performance than would otherwise be the case.  Public school students 
may get an adequate education, but that is all that they will get.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has said that the separation of 
powers requires that it “be as zealous in protecting the rights of the other 
coequal branches” as it is in protecting its own rights.166  Because there is a 
textually demonstrable commitment of education funding and education 
policy to the legislative branch, and because what an adequate education 
comprises and costs are quintessentially political questions, Claremont 
represents a clear trespass on legislative powers and should be overruled.  
If Claremont is not overruled, then it is about time that the representative 
branches take to heart James Madison’s words in The Federalist No. 49, 
“[t]he several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their 
common commission, none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclu-
sive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective 
powers,” 167 and start acting like co-equals. 
 
  
Admiral Kirk in Star Trek II: “Do not grieve, Admiral. . . .  It is logical. . . .  The needs . . . of the many 
. . . outweigh . . . the needs of the few.” Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (Paramount 1982) (motion 
picture). 
 165. It should come as no surprise, then, that if “taken literally, there is not a public school system in 
America that meets” Claremont II’s aspirational guidelines.  William E. Thro, A New Approach to 
State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & Pol. 525, 548 (1998); see also 
Obhof, supra n. 27, at 595 (describing the guidelines as “essentially useless”). 
 166. Evans, 506 A.2d at 699. 
 167. The Federalist No. 49, supra n. 62 (James Madison). 
